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ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates the effect of hedging on the values of 42 U.S. oil and gas 
producing firms from 2002 to 2006. We use a unique hand-collected data set on all linear 
and nonlinear hedging positions of these firms. In contrast to recent studies, we find that 
hedging oil price risk using nonlinear instruments, such as options, increases the value of 
the firm. Linear hedging contracts have little (oil contracts) or negative (gas contracts) 
effect on firm valuation. In addition, we find that energy price volatility negatively 
affects firm valuation, but has little influence on the relation between hedging activities 
and the value of the firm.  
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1. Introduction 
The effect of hedging on the value of the firm is a controversial issue. Perfect 
capital structure in the world of Modigliani and Miller (1958), in which there are no 
information asymmetries, taxes, and transaction costs, risk management cannot add value 
to the firm, since investors are able to implement individually the same strategy and 
mitigate the risk; however, the lack of the perfect capital structure in the real world 
rationalizes the hedging activities.  
On the theoretical level, studies state that risk management has an impact on the 
value of the firm; however, empirical evidence is diverse
1
. In a recent study, Jin and 
Jorion (2006) use a sample of firms in the U.S. oil and gas industry and conclude that 
hedging reduces the sensitivity of the stock price to the movement of the price of oil and 
gas, but does not influence firm value.  
We employ a more recent sample of oil and gas firms than that of Jin and Jorion  
and show that hedging has an impact on the value of the firm. We collect our data for the 
period 2002 to 2006, when the price (volatility) of oil and gas is higher (lower) than the 
price (volatility) during 1998 – 2001, which is the period of Jin and Jorion (2006) study. 
We differentiate between "linear" contracts (such as futures and forwards), whose impact 
is either negative (for gas industry) or negligible (for oil industry), and nonlinear 
contracts (e.g., options), which increase the value of the firm. We also implement a 
                                                 
1
 The theoretical papers are Mayers and Smith (1982), Smith and Stulz (1985), Leland (1998), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), 
Nance et al. (1993), Géczy et al. (1997), and empirical studies are Tufano (1996), Allayannis and Weston (2001), Carter, Rogers, 
and Simkins (2005), Guay and Kothari (2003), and Jin and Jorion (2006).  
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model based on 180 days historical volatility of future oil and gas prices to evaluate the 
effect of volatility on the impact of hedging on firm value.   
Considering a sample of oil and gas producers has several advantages. Energy 
companies not only have a financial exposure, but also use a wide variety of hedging 
positions. In addition, changes in the price of oil and gas have a substantial effect on the 
cash flows of these firms. Moreover, hedging a position against movements in energy 
prices is easy relative to hedging foreign currency exchange rates. Therefore, an oil and 
gas producer might not gain from hedging, thereby satisfying Modigliani and Miller 
conclusions. Our sample of oil and gas producers also includes a broad variety of firm 
sizes, in contrast to Allayannis and Weston (2001) sample, which consists of firms whose 
assets are greater than $500 million. Therefore, our sample allows us to investigate the 
effect of hedging not only in large firms, but also in small firms. An additional advantage 
of studying energy producers is that they disclose their hedging positions in a greater 
detail than other firms do. They consistently report the value of oil and gas reserves, 
extraction costs and net present value of profits from the reserves in their 10-K filings 
required by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This information minimizes the 
likelihood of missing variables in our sample. 
We hand-collect the data on 42 U.S. oil and gas producers from 2002 to 2006 that 
results in 210 firm-year observations. Our sample is smaller than that of Jin and Jorion, 
which included 119 firms, because a number of mergers and acquisitions have taken 
place in this industry in recent years. We also face hedging positions in some firms, 
which are impossible to value due to their complexity and corresponding lack of 
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information. Despite these issues, our sample is still larger than that of Carter et al. 
(2005), in which they study only 27 airlines.  
In order to evaluate the hypothesis that hedging increases the value of the firm, 
we implement a model similar to the model in Jin and Jorion (2006), but with separate 
variables for linear and nonlinear contracts. The model estimates a linear relation 
between Tobin’s Q and the relative delta, representing the hedging positions in the firm 
normalized by the firms’ production or reserves of oil and gas. In our model, the 
coefficient on the relative delta of nonlinear contracts for both production and reserve in 
oil hedging is positive and significant. This result implies that nonlinear oil hedging 
increases the value of the firm. The coefficient on the oil linear contracts is negligible and 
insignificant; however, the coefficient on gas linear contracts is negative and significant 
that describes gas linear contracts as a negative impact on the value of the firm. We find a 
positive and significant coefficient for the investment growth variable. This result 
explains that future investment opportunities have a large positive impact on the value of 
the firm. In contrast to the results in Jin and Jorion (2006), the coefficient on the 
production cost is negligible implying that the relatively high gross profit of oil and gas 
producers underweights the negative impact of production cost on the value of the firm.  
We also test the hypothesis that oil and gas price volatility influences the relation 
between hedging activities and the value of the firm. We do not obtain statistically 
significant results; nevertheless, the coefficient on the cross term between nonlinear oil 
contracts and the value of 180-day historical volatility of oil prices is consistently 
negative. This implies a small negative impact of nonlinear oil contracts on the firm value 
in a relatively volatile market.       
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2. Motivation and Background 
Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) state that hedging reduces 
the costs related to highly volatile cash flows. It reduces the expected tax in case of a 
convex tax function and expected cost of financial distress. Leland (1998) explains that 
hedging increases the debt capacity of the firm and, consequently, helps the firm to 
benefit from tax advantages of higher leverage. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), 
Nance et al. (1993) and Géczy et al. (1997) argue that hedging may mitigate the problem 
of underinvestment when the cost of external financing is high and limiting the expansion 
capacity of the firm.  Tax incentives, when the tax function is convex, cost of borrowing 
that increases by the volatility of earnings, cost of bankruptcy and liquidation costs are 
some of explanations for implementing hedging in a firm.  
  Other studies explain the benefit of hedging from the management’s point of view 
and conclude that hedging has no effect on market value. Stulz (1984) and Smith and 
Stulz (1985) claim that risk-averse managers implement hedging when the company that 
they manage is the substantial part of their capital. Moreover, DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1995) state that hedging is a signal of better management to investors.    
There are other characteristics of the firm in relation to the hedging. While small 
firms are more vulnerable to financial distress, large firms are more likely to hedge 
(Mian, 1996). The high fixed cost of hedging accounts for this contradiction. For 
instance, Brown (2001) estimates that a $3 billion derivative position costs about $4 
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million for a large multinational firm. In addition, Dolde (1995) and Haushalter (2000) 
claim for a positive relation between hedging and leverage. Graham and Rogers (2002) 
underweight tax convexity as a reason for hedging, but claims that hedging bolsters the 
increasing of debt capacity. 
Nevertheless, there is no strong support for a single theory, and empirical 
evidence is diverse. Tufano (1996) finds no evidence for value maximization due to 
hedging in gold mining firms. Allayannis and Weston (2001) provide evidence that the 
market value of firms with foreign currency derivatives is 5% higher on average than the 
market value of firms without these derivatives. In addition, Graham and Rogers (2002) 
state that debt capacity induced by derivatives increases the value of the firm by 1.1%. 
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2005) report 14% hedging premium for U.S. airlines with 
fuel cost hedging. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) bring these results into question. 
They evaluate a sample of non-financial derivative users and conclude that the hedging 
premium is relative small, compared to cash flows and changes in equity values. They 
also claim that other risk management practices account for gains in the market value. Jin 
and Jorion (2006) also find that hedging is unlikely to have an effect on the market value 
of the U.S. oil and gas producers.  
In next three sections, we describe the sample and variables, review the models 
for testing the hypotheses that hedging increases the value of the firm and the historical 
volatility influences the impact of hedging on the value of the firm, report our results, and 
finish with concluding remarks.  
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3. Sample Description 
We hand-collect a sample of 42 U.S. oil and gas firms from 2002 to 2006 and 
obtain 210 firm-year observations. Similarly to Jin and Jorion (2006), we select firms 
with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of 1311, that is related to group 13 
―Oil and Gas Extractions‖. SIC 1311 limits our list to ―Crude Petroleum and Natural 
Gas‖ that eventually produces a list of 92 companies. Then we select companies which 
meet the following conditions for the period of our study: they filed 10-K reports, oil and 
gas production and reserve data are available, the market value of the equity is available, 
the information in 10-K filing is sufficient to value the hedging position of the firm and 
the book value of assets is greater than $20 million. The final list includes 42 companies, 
all present in all 5 years, and 210 firm-year observations in total. All companies in our list 
have exposures to both oil and gas and are engaged in exploration and production, which 
means linear contracts, such as fixed-price contracts or swaps are included in hedging 
positions. Our sample includes both small and large firms, whose main activities are oil 
and gas exploration and production, rather than refining or processing. Therefore, in 
terms of type of exposure to commodity price, our sample is relatively homogeneous that 
limits the correlation between hedging and other firm characteristics. For instance, Coles, 
Lemmon and Meschke (2003) explain such correlation between firm value and 
managerial ownership, and Jin and Jorion (2006) refute the positive effect of foreign 
currency derivatives on the value of the firm and state that ―the hedging premium 
observed for multinationals reflects other factors, such as informational asymmetries or 
operational hedges, which add value but happen to be positively correlated with the 
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presence of derivatives. In a sample without such spurious correlation, the effect of 
derivatives disappears.‖  
3.1. Hedging Variables  
 In January 1997, SEC expanded its requirement for market risk disclosure under 
Financial Reporting Release No. 48, (FRR 48). Under this issue, companies must provide 
quantitative information about their market risks in tabular, sensitivity analysis or value-
at-risk formats. In our sample, the tabular disclosure is the most common format, in 
which instruments are classified as follows: 
1) Fixed or variable rate assets or liabilities 
2) Long or short forwards or futures 
3) Written or purchased call or put options 
4) Received-fixed or variable swaps 
The weighted average settlement price of contracts, weighted average pay and receive 
rates and/or prices of the swaps, weighted average of strike price of option and the 
amount of all contracts are reported based on FRR 48 requirement.  
To value the hedging positions of the companies in our list, we manually extract this 
information from 10-K filings of the companies. Then, following Jin and Jorion, we 
assume ∆=-1 for all shorting positions in linear contracts such as fixed-price contracts, 
short futures and forwards, and received-fixed swaps and ∆=1 for all long positions in the 
same contracts.  
We use the Black-Sholes option pricing model to calculate the delta for all 
nonlinear contracts. Next, we multiply the size of the contract by the value of delta and 
sum them up to obtain the total value of the delta for both contract types, as well as the 
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total delta for all linear and nonlinear contracts separately. All firms in our sample have a 
zero or negative delta in oil and gas, indicating hedging, rather than speculating positions 
in all firm years. Finally, we scale the total value of delta by the production in the next 
year or the value of the reserves:  
(1) 
Relative delta (Total/Linear/Nonlinear) oil(gas) production=-delta oil(gas) / Next-year oil(gas) production                    
(2)                  
Relative delta (Total/Linear/Nonlinear) oil(gas) reserve=-delta oil(gas) / Same-year oil(gas) reserve 
The first measure indicates the percentage of the next year production hedged, and the 
second one indicates the percentage of the reserve hedged.  
In our sample, 145 firm-years hedge both oil and gas; there is no hedging in 33 
observations. Table I provides the information about the hedging positions of our sample.      
For the evaluation of the effect of the historical volatility, we calculate the 
historical volatility of NYMEX future crude oil and gas prices during 180 calendar days 
ending on the last day of the fiscal year. We also use the median of all 180 days historical 
volatilities to construct a high/low dummy variable for the volatility. The dummy 
variable is equal to 1 when the value of the 180-day historical volatility is higher than the 
10 years median and 0 when it is lower, for oil and gas separately.      
3.2. Q ratios 
We use Tobin’s Q ratio to measure the market value of the firm. In fact, Tobin’s 
Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the current replacement cost of the assets. 
Jin and Jorion propose several methods to calculate the Q ratio since oil and gas reserves 
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are the main assets of the firms in this industry. We follow this approach and construct 
three different measures of Q ratio for each firm-year. 
The numerators in all Q ratios are identical and approximate the market value of 
the firm. We obtain it by adding the book value of assets and the difference of book value 
and market value of the equity. The denominator should reflect the replacement cost of 
the assets. For the first definition of Q ratio, Q1, it is the book value of the assets minus 
the book value of the proved oil and gas reserves, plus the net present value of the future 
revenues from the reserves. This NPV is ―Standardized measure of oil and gas reserves‖ 
required by SFAS No.69 that is the estimated future revenues after extraction costs and 
taxes, generated from the production of proven reserves discounted by 10% annual rate.  
In Q2, the denominator is the same as in Q1, except we replace the net present value of 
the reserves by the book value. Finally, denominator in Q3 is simply the book value of 
assets.     
BV total assets - BV common equity + MV common equity
1  (3)
BV total assets - BV oil/gas proved reserves + NPV oil/gas proved reserves
BV total assets - BV common equity + MV common equity
2
BV total a
Q
Q

   (4)
ssets - BV oil/gas proved reserves + MV oil/gas proved reserves
BV total assets - BV common equity + MV common equity
3                           (5)
BV total assets
Q 
 
There is a positive correlation between Q variables, 0.68, 0.46 and 0.77 between Q1 and 
Q2, Q2 and Q3, and Q1 and Q3, respectively. Table II presents the value and 
characteristics of the firm-years in our sample. 
Panel A presents the distribution of the assets, market value, reserve, and Q ratios 
for all 210 observations. Due to the oil and gas prices being higher than those in the 
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period of Jin and Jorion (2006) sample, the values of the assets and reserves are 
substantially higher than the values reported in their paper. The large number of mergers 
and acquisitions in recent years also account for the higher market and reserve values 
relative to the period from 1998 to 2001. In addition, Panel A indicates that our sample 
includes small firms—ten percent of observations have total assets less than $87 million. 
Panels B to G provide information about oil hedgers and gas hedgers for linear and 
nonlinear contracts separately. An average (median) firm hedges 30% (27%) of its next 
year production, which corresponds to only 3% (2%) of their reserves. For gas hedging, 
these numbers amount to 36% (32%) and 4% (3%) for hedging ratios of next year 
production and reserve, respectively. In all firm-years the hedging ratios are positive, 
indicating hedging positions. 
Panel H describes the statistics of nonhedgers. It does not show any substantial difference 
between the average size of these firms and those of oil or gas hedgers. In contrast to Jin 
and Jorion (2006) sample firms, our study shows slightly higher Q ratio for nonhedgers.  
 
4. Firm Value and Hedging 
We adopt the same multivariate analysis as in Jin and Jorion (2006) to test the impact of 
hedging on Q ratios. Since a number of other variables can affect the Q ratios, we use a 
multivariate model to isolate the effect of hedging for our analysis. We implement three 
regressions for each Q and for oil and gas separately, resulting in six regressions: 
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_ _                                    (6)
_ _                                 (7)
_ _
j j j
k j j j
k j j
Q Hedging dummy Control Variable
Q Delta production Control Variable
Q Delta reserve Control V
   
   
  
     
     
                                            (8)
={ , , }
jariable
k Linear Nonlinear Total

   
 
For instance, Delta_reserve (Linear) for gas is the relative delta of linear gas contracts of 
reserves calculated in equation (2). The hedging dummy is one if the company hedges 
and is zero otherwise, for oil and gas separately.  
In models 7 and 8, we measure the effect of the value of hedging that provides 
more information than model 6, in which we measure exclusively the effect of whether 
the company hedges or not.   
To analyze the effect of historical volatility on the value of hedging, which is our second 
hypothesis, we implement the following models: 
 
1
2
_ _ 180_
180_ _                                                         (9)
k j j j
k
Q Delta production Control Variable HV Dummy
HV Dummy Delta production
   
 
       
  
 
1
2
_ _ 180_
180_ _                                                       (10)
k j j j
k
Q Delta reserve Control Variable HV Dummy
HV Dummy Delta reserve
   
 
       
  
 
1
2
_ _ 180
180 _                                                                 (11)
k j j j
k
Q Delta production Control Variable HV
HV Delta production
   
 
       
  
 
1
2
_ _ 180
180 _                                                                           (12)
={ , , }
k j j j
k
Q Delta reserve Control Variable HV
HV Delta reserve
k Linear Nonlinear Total
   
 
       
  
 
Here, HV180_Dummy is one if the 180-day historical volatility of NYMEX future oil 
(gas) prices on the last day of the fiscal year is higher than the median of the last 10 years 
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historical 180-day volatility of same underlying asset. HV180 is the 180-day historical 
volatility of NYMEX future oil (gas) prices on the last day of the fiscal year.  
Control variables in our models are the same as those in Jin and Jorion (2006) as follows: 
a) Firm Size: since large firms tend more to hedge than small firms, we include this 
factor as a control variable. The log of the total book value of the assets is the 
substitute for this variable in our model. 
b) Profitability: we use ROA as the substitute for profitability which is supposed to 
increase (positive coefficient) the Q ratio. 
c) Investment Growth: we assume that firms with a higher potential for future 
investment have a higher value. We use the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets as a substitute and expect a positive coefficient in our model. 
d)  Access to financial markets: it is rational to assume that limited access to 
financial resources shifts firm’s investments in projects with higher net present 
value and consequently these firms have higher Q ratios. We use a dividend 
dummy, which is one if the firm pays dividend, as the substitute for this 
parameter. Based on our explanation the coefficient of this parameter is supposed 
to be negative. 
e) Leverage: Capital structure also has an impact on the firm value. We calculate the 
financial leverage as the average total assets over average total common equity.  
f) Production costs: firms with higher production costs should have lower Q ratios. 
Oil and gas producers report their production costs per BOE (Barrel of Oil 
Equivalent) or Mcfe (thousand cubic feet equivalent) in their 10-K filings. We 
expect a negative coefficient for this parameter.  
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To eliminate the skewness of the Q ratios, the dependent variables in our model 
are the log of the Q ratios and depict the elasticity. Annual dummies are also included in 
our model. In addition, we eliminate the effect of firm specific clustering and 
heteroskedasticity using the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) method (Liang and 
Zeger, 1986).   
Table III reports the regression results for models 6, 7 and 8.  The coefficients of 
hedging dummies are not statistically significant. However, the coefficient of the relative 
delta of nonlinear contracts, for both production and reserve, in oil hedging is positive 
and significant for Q1 and Q2. It is reasonable because Q3 does not take into account the 
values of oil and gas reserves. Since the market value of the reserves is included into Q2 
formula, we find positive and significant coefficients for all linear, nonlinear, and total oil 
hedging deltas relative to reserve and nonlinear gas hedging relative to reserve. The table 
also reports the negative impact of linear gas contracts on the value of the firm; however, 
they are not statistically significant except for Q3 and delta relative to reserve. The latter 
result is intuitive because most of the linear contracts are long term fixed-price contracts 
that do not allow the firm to fully capture the benefits from the substantial increase in 
energy prices in recent years. Consequently, these contracts decrease the value of the firm. 
This price increase did not occur in years 1998 to 2001, the period of Jin and Jorion 
(2006) sample. 
The results for the control variables are similar to the results in Jin and Jorion (2006). 
Investment growth is the only variable that is always positive and statistically significant 
in all Q ratios and models. ROA is also positive and significant for Q1 and Q3 ratios, 
however, it has no significant value for Q2. It is rational since the average value of the 
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reserve is four times greater than the value of the assets in our sample, which means the 
large values of the reserves dominate the effect of the value of the assets in Q2 and 
impact the effect of ROA in our model. In contrast to the results of Jin and Jorion (2006), 
production costs do not show a negative value for Q3 in our research, i.e. it is almost zero 
for all Q3 models. This implies the profit margin of oil and gas producers is so high due 
to the high energy prices in recent years that it dominates the negative impact of 
production costs on the value of the firm.  
Table IV describes the result of our models 9, 10, 11 and 12 for analyzing the effect 
of historical volatility. In all models, we focus on cross terms 
HV180*Delta_Production(Reserve) and HV180_Dummy* Delta_Production(Reserve). 
The coefficient of this parameter is consistently negative for all nonlinear oil hedging, it 
is significant only for the conventional definition of Q (the Q3 dependent variable). It 
implies that nonlinear hedging has a smaller impact on the value of the firm in a highly 
volatile market. For the gas hedging, the coefficient of Delta_Production*HV180 and 
Delta_reserve*HV180 for all linear contracts is negative but insignificant. It implies that 
a volatile market reduces the impact of linear contracts on the value of the firm. We had 
the same result in nonlinear contracts for oil hedging, because linear contracts in gas 
hedging and nonlinear contracts in oil hedging have the highest portion of hedging 
activities in term of the size of the contracts. In addition, the coefficient of HV180 
variable is negative for all oil hedging contracts and Q ratios and significant for Q1 and 
Q2, while this coefficient is positive for all gas hedging contracts and Q ratios. It implies 
that a higher volatility of oil (gas) prices decreases (increases) the value of the firm. The 
results for the gas hedging are not consistent across different definitions of the Q ratio. 
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This might be the effect of long term fixed-price contracts.  These results are robust to the 
choice of 30-day and 90-day horizons for measuring historical volatility. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we evaluate the hedging of 42 U.S. oil and gas producers over the 
period from 2002 to 2006. The problem of endogeneity, which usually occurs when we 
collect samples from one industry, is negligible here since this industry is homogenous, 
and the hedging positions are substantially different across firms. We price the value of 
hedging contracts by taking advantage of the relatively informative 10-K filings by these 
firms. Oil and gas producers also disclose all information about their reserves and 
production costs, that helps us to construct reliable Q ratios for testing our hypotheses. 
With Q ratios calculated based on our samples, we find a significant positive impact of 
hedging on the value of the firm for nonlinear oil hedging contracts and a negative impact 
of linear hedging gas contracts. Moreover, energy price volatility decreases the impact of 
hedging with nonlinear oil and linear gas contracts on the firm value.  
Clearly, there is no consensus about a theory that would explain the advantages or 
disadvantages of hedging activities yet. Further research, such as studying why nonlinear 
oil hedging has a positive and linear gas hedging has a negative impact on the value of 
the firm should be performed. The timing of financial report releases and corresponding 
effect on market valuations should be addressed to improve the measurement of the Q 
ratios. The findings in this paper will also be made more general by extending the sample 
to the period from 1998 to 2001 studied by Jin and Jorion (2006). Finally, our 
econometric model can be improved by combining linear and nonlinear deltas for both oil 
and gas contracts in the same equation. 
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Table I 
Description of Sample by Hedging Decisions 
This Table displays the number of firm-years that have/have not oil or gas hedging position 
  Oil Hedgers Nonoil Hedgers Total  
Gas Hedgers 145 30 175 
Nongas Hedgers 2 33 35 
Total  147 63 210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II 
Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
Panel A presents the statistics of 42 U.S. oil and gas producers over the period of 2002 to 2006, Panels B to H present 
subsamples of linear and nonlinear oil hedgers, linear and nonlinear gas hedgers, and non-hedgers, respectively.   
  Observation Mean SD Median 
10th 
 Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
Panel A: All Firm-Years 
Total assets($m) 210 3,751 7,616 775 87 12,463 
Market value of equity($m) 210 3,465 6,440 787 71 12,004 
Value of reserve($m) 210 16,083 30,826 3524 365 55,746 
Q1 210 1.37 0.73 1.22 0.82 2.03 
Q2 210 0.40 0.29 0.35 0.22 0.56 
Q3 210 1.77 1.38 1.50 1.12 2.38 
Panel B: Firm-Years with Oil Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 147 4,078 7,680 982 179 12,604 
Market value of equity($m) 147 3,496 5,973 1,068 149 12,277 
Value of reserve($m) 147 17,071 2,986 4,582 609 54,974 
Oil Production hedged(%) 147 30% 19% 27% 8% 59% 
Oil reserve hedged(%) 147 3% 3% 2% 1% 5% 
Q1 147 1.35 0.52 1.23 0.88 1.95 
Q2 147 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.55 
Q3 147 1.59 0.48 1.49 1.14 2.23 
Panel C: Firm-Years with Linear Oil Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 95 5,110 8,431 1,633 218 15,872 
Market value of equity($m) 95 4,370 6,557 1,472 209 13,236 
Value of reserve($m) 95 21,209 31,406 7,308 768 64,206 
Oil Production hedged(%) 95 27% 22% 23% 4% 58% 
Oil reserve hedged(%) 95 3% 2% 2% 0% 5% 
Q1 95 1.36 0.52 1.26 0.95 1.86 
Q2 95 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.23 0.52 
Q3 95 1.61 0.45 1.49 1.17 2.27 
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Table II – Continued 
Panel D: Firm-Years with Nonlinear Oil Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 100 4,303 8,650 912 201 16,427 
Market value of equity($m) 100 3,494 6,476 997 215 12,004 
Value of reserve($m) 100 14,443 33,426 4,357 629 68,466 
Oil Production hedged(%) 100 19% 14% 18% 3% 31% 
Oil reserve hedged(%) 100 2% 4% 2% 0% 4% 
Q1 100 1.39 0.58 1.24 0.89 2.09 
Q2 100 0.40 0.17 0.39 0.23 0.57 
Q3 100 1.56 0.49 1.47 1.12 2.20 
Panel E: Firm-Years with Gas Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 175 3,783 7,425 929 173 9,750 
Market value of equity($m) 175 3,446 5,998 972 119 11,846 
Value of reserve($m) 175 16,074 29,237 3,955 565 53,694 
Gas Production hedged(%) 175 36% 22% 32% 13% 68% 
Gas reserve hedged(%) 175 4% 3% 3% 1% 8% 
Q1 175 1.35 0.57 1.23 0.81 2.00 
Q2 175 0.41 0.30 0.35 0.23 0.55 
Q3 175 1.71 1.05 1.47 1.12 2.33 
Panel F: Firm-Years with Gas Linear Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 124 5,019 8,497 1,263 218 16,193 
Market value of equity($m) 124 4,552 6,776 1,384 161 14,710 
Value of reserve($m) 124 21,360 33,136 6,820 768 69,804 
Gas Production hedged(%) 124 31% 29% 26% 4% 64% 
Gas reserve hedged(%) 124 3% 4% 2% 0% 7% 
Q1 124 1.40 0.59 1.25 0.87 2.06 
Q2 124 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.54 
Q3 124 1.80 1.20 1.52 1.15 2.48 
Panel G: Firm-Years with Gas Nonlinear Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 140 3,788 7,445 938 169 10,113 
Market value of equity($m) 140 3,103 5,143 820 126 11,763 
Value of reserve($m) 140 15,574 28,073 3,917 507 55,746 
Gas Production hedged(%) 140 17% 27% 14% 1% 51% 
Gas reserve hedged(%) 140 2% 3% 1% 0% 5% 
Q1 140 1.31 0.52 1.21 0.82 1.93 
Q2 140 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.54 
Q3 140 1.53 0.46 1.45 1.09 2.09 
Panel H: Firm-Years without Hedging Activities 
Total assets($m) 33 3,755 8,727 92 47 17,844 
Market value of equity($m) 33 3,684 8,531 171 30 15,229 
Value of reserve($m) 33 16,731 38,823 653 193 78,758 
Q1 33 1.52 1.30 1.18 0.88 2.20 
Q2 33 0.37 0.23 0.30 0.18 0.62 
Q3 33 2.11 2.48 1.58 1.13 2.62 
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Table III 
Hedging and Firm Value 
 This table presents the regression results of the cross sectional time series least square regression testing the impact of 
hedging on firm value. The sample includes 210 firm-year observations over the period from 2002 to 2006. The natural 
logs of the Q1, Q2 and Q3 are the dependent variables. Hedging dummies, relative delta values for linear, nonlinear 
and total contracts, the control variables and year dummies are the independent variables. We use the Generalized 
Estimation Equations (GEEs) method to eliminate the effect of firm specific clustering and heteroskedasticity. Year 
dummies are used in the model, but their coefficients are not reported. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. * and ** 
indicate the significance at the 95% and 99% levels, respectively. 
Oil Gas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Hedging dummy -0.050 -0.182
(-0.64) (-1.37)
Delta_Production(Total) 0.080 0.035
(0.64) (0.26)
Delta_Production(Linear) -0.043 -0.126
(-0.41) (-1.14)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.133** 0.350
(3.70) (1.59)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 1.24 -0.983
(1.90) (-0.95)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) -0.400 -1.564
(-0.37) (-1.82)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 1.904** -0.227
(3.18) (-0.62)
Log(asset) 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.035 0.015 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.017
(1.06) (0.71) (0.85) (0.68) (0.68) (0.82) (0.68) (1.87) (0.81) (0.96) (0.64) (1.01) (1.01) (0.84)
ROA 0.017** 0.018** 0.018** 0.019** 0.019** 0.018** 0.019** 0.016** 0.018** 0.018** 0.019** 0.017** 0.017** 0.018**
(2.7) (2.72) (2.62) (2.71) (2.81) (2.61) (2.74) (2.62) (2.72) (2.61) (2.87) (2.60) (2.59) (2.62)
Inv_Growth 0.71* 0.647* 0.690* 0.640* 0.603* 0.689* 0.640* 0.785* 0.662* 0.695* 0.622 0.719* 0.721* 0.679*
(2.17) (1.96) (2.08) (1.98) (1.99) (2.20) (2.02) (2.37) (2.06) (2.11) (1.95) (2.18) (2.20) (2.09)
Leverage 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.52) (0.45) (0.51) (0.64) (0.55) (0.49) (0.70) (0.44) (0.48) (0.58) (0.75) (0.40) (0.57) (0.43)
Dividend dummy -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.01 -0.020 -0.015 -0.005 -0.050 -0.018 -0.018 -0.01 -0.024 -0.017 -0.022
(-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.11) (-0.23) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-0.52) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.24)
Production cost 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.99) (1.82) (1.77) (1.72) (1.75) (1.78) (1.64) (2.00) (1.78) (1.75) (1.43) (1.81) (1.71) (1.81)
Panel A: dependent variable is ln(Q1), Q1=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets - BV Oil/Gas Reserves+NPV of Reserves)
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Table III – Continued 
 
Oil Gas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Hedging dummy 0.022 -0.051
(0.28) (-0.38)
Delta_Production(Total) 0.129 -0.116
(1.01) (-0.85)
Delta_Production(Linear) -0.023 -0.312*
(-0.19) (-2.33)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.132** 0.397*
(3.37) (2.05)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 3.03** 1.23
(3.39) (1.19)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) 2.262* -0.578
(2.28) (-0.57)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 2.860* 1.861**
(2.46) (4.04)
Log(asset) 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.004
(0.21) (0.16) (0.29) (0.18) (0.06) (0.22) (0.14) (0.50) (0.42) (0.53) (0.15) (0.14) (0.34) (0.13)
ROA 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007
(1.24) (1.24) (1.13) (1.23) (1.52) (1.29) (1.31) (1.24) (1.12) (1.12) (1.34) (1.30) (1.14) (1.22)
Inv_Growth 0.77** 0.749** 0.800** 0.759** 0.002 0.704** 0.743** 0.823** 0.829** 0.845** 0.734** 0.735** 0.810** 0.753**
(3.15) (2.98) (3.07) (3.00) (0.21) (2.89) (3.00) (3.14) (3.11) (3.16) (2.92) (2.80) (3.10) (2.96)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.173 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.02) (-0.00) (0.06) (0.20) (-1.42) (-0.09) (0.36) (0.03) (0.03) (0.27) (0.37) (0.12) (0.06) (0.32)
Dividend dummy -0.169 -0.170 -0.168 -0.160 0.001 -0.187 -0.149 -0.178 -0.171 -0.168 -0.159 -0.161 -0.169 -0.144
(-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.34) (-1.27) 0.93 (-1.49) (-1.20) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-1.37) (-1.26) (-1.30) (-1.35) (-1.15)
Production cost 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.81) 0.90 (0.81) (0.70) (0.93) (1.12) (0.60) (0.86) (0.86) (0.54) (0.31) (1.00) (0.77) (0.84)
Panel B: dependent variable is ln(Q2), Q2=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets - BV Oil/Gas Reserves+MV of Reserves)
 
Oil Gas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Hedging dummy -0.126 -0.086
(-1.44) (-0.77)
Delta_Production(Total) -0.070 0.056
(-0.52) (0.46)
Delta_Production(Linear) -0.042 0.077
(-0.33) (0.52)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.039 -0.032
(1.05) (-0.14)
Delta_Reserve(Total) -0.107 -2.362**
(-0.14) (-3.31)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) -0.553 -1.289**
(-0.47) (-2.29)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 0.158 -0.911
(0.21) (-1.62)
Log(asset) -0.046* 0.056** -0.057** -0.058** -0.057** -0.057** -0.058** -0.049** -0.059** -0.059** -0.057** -0.050* -0.054** -0.055**
(-2.20) (-2.75) (-2.78) (-2.83) (-2.78) (-2.78) (-2.80) (-2.84) (-3.06) (-3.04) (-2.75) (-2.36) (-2.66) (-2.68)
ROA 0.026** 0.027** 0.027** 0.028 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 0.026** 0.028** 0.028** 0.027** 0.026** 0.027** 0.027**
(3.07) (3.04) (2.99) (2.98) (3.01) (2.96) (2.98) (2.86) (2.98) (2.97) (3.00) (2.91) (2.93) (2.96)
Inv_Growth 0.745* 0.675* 0.668* 0.642* 0.658* 0.674* 0.649* 0.704* 0.633* 0.639* 0.657* 0.760* 0.691* 0.671*
(2.28) (2.10) (2.12) (1.99) (2.03) (2.15) (2.01) (2.30) (2.07) (2.08) (2.00) (2.41) (2.21) (2.10)
Leverage 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.014* 0.015* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.013* 0.015* 0.013
(2.24) (2.14) (2.11) (2.16) (2.11) (2.09) (2.12) (2.11) (2.08) (1.99) (2.01) (2.00) (2.26) (1.89)
Dividend dummy 0.083 0.084 0.085 0.086 0.083 0.088 0.084 0.068 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.069 0.084 0.070
(0.88) (0.87) (0.89) (0.86) (0.85) (0.91) (0.84) (0.71) (0.86) (0.85) (0.83) (0.71) (0.87) (0.70)
Production cost 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.29) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12)
Panel C: dependent variable is ln(Q3), Q3=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets)
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Table IV 
Hedging, Historical Volatility and Firm Value 
This table presents the regression results of the cross sectional time series least square regression testing the impact of 
hedging on firm value. The sample includes 210 firm-year observations over the period from 2002 to 2006. The natural 
logs of the Q1, Q2 and Q3 are the dependent variables. The natural logs of the Q1, Q2 and Q3 are the dependent 
variables. Relative delta values for linear, nonlinear and total contracts, the control variables, and year dummies are the 
independent variables. HV_180_Oil (Gas) is the 180-day historical volatility of NYMEX future oil (gas) prices on the 
last day of the fiscal year. HV_Dummy is one if the 180-day historical volatility of NYMEX future oil (gas) prices on 
last day of the fiscal year is higher than the median of the 180-days historical volatility in last 10 years. We use the 
Generalized Estimation Equations (GEEs) method to eliminate the effect of firm specific clustering and 
heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. * and ** indicate the significance at the 95% and 99% levels, 
respectively. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Delta_Production(Total) 0.214 -0.043
(0.39) (-0.12)
Delta_Production(Total)*HV180 -0.377 0.151
(-0.20) (0.26)
Delta_Production(Linear) 0.049 -0.026
(0.10) (-0.09)
Delta_Production(Linear)*HV180 -0.049 -0.089
(-0.03) (-0.20)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.214 -0.082
(1.09) (-0.14)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear)*HV180 -0.397 0.622
(-0.52) (0.72)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 4.612 0.071
(1.39) (0.03)
Delta_Reserve(Total)*HV180 -11.612 -1.234
(-0.96) (-0.36)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) 3.061 0.231
(0.59) (0.11)
Delta_Reserve(Linear)*HV180 -7.966 -2.219
(-0.50) (-0.61)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 4.693 0.592
(1.50) (0.14)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear)*HV180 -11.640 -1.270
(-0.97) (-0.26)
HV180 -3.850** -3.919** -3.824** -3.670** -3.875** -3.730** 1.454** 1.517** 1.408** 1.549** 1.537** 1.52**
(-3.66) (-4.04) (-3.90) (-3.61) (-4.04) (-3.80) (3.09) (3.77) (3.41) (3.47) (3.88) (4.10)
Log(asset) -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001
(-0.19) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.15) (0.12) (-0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.03)
ROA 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017* 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(2.70) (2.60) (2.72) (2.84) (2.63) (2.76) (2.66) (2.55) (2.99) (2.67) (2.58) (2.61)
Inv_Growth 0.365 0.387 0.393 0.331 0.366 0.393 0.381 0.428 0.379 0.441 0.453 0.409
(1.10) (1.13) (1.20) (1.04) (1.11) (1.21) (1.20) (1.30) (1.17) (1.29) (1.32) (1.23)
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.26) (0.27) (0.44) (0.41) (0.24) (0.48) (0.31) (0.38) (0.61) (0.24) (0.41) (0.23)
Dividend dummy -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.012 -0.016 -0.002 -0.01 -0.010 -0.002 -0.017 -0.012 -0.016
(-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.15) (-0.19) (-0.03) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.02) (-0.19) (-0.15) (-0.19)
Production cost 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.79) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.76) (0.80) (0.75) (0.77) (0.46) (0.81) (0.75) (0.78)
Panel A: dependent variable is ln(Q1), Q1=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets - BV Oil/Gas Reserves+NPV of Reserves)
GasOil
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Table IV – Continued 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Delta_Production(Total) 0.510 -0.054
(1.02) (-016)
Delta_Production(Total)*HV180 -1.159 -0.037
(-0.63) (-0.08)
Delta_Production(Linear) 0.452 -0.172
(0.97) (-0.61)
Delta_Production(Linear)*HV180 -1.222 -0.121
(-0.77) (-0.31)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.257 0.246
(1.13) (0.51)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear)*HV180 -0.597 0.142
(-0.65) (0.20)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 3.774 1.555
(1.15) (0.76)
Delta_Reserve(Total)*HV180 -2.262 0.844
(-0.19) (0.23)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) 6.890 1.375
(1.37) (0.69)
Delta_Reserve(Linear)*HV180 -10.413 -1.569
(-0.65) (-0.43)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 3.107 2.841
(1.06) (0.98)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear)*HV180 -2.919 -1.463
(-0.23) (-0.43)
HV180 -3.510** -3.624** -3.613** -3.778** -3.798** -3.675** 1.448** 1.461** 1.401** 1.418** 1.454** 1.427**
(-3.96) (-4.50) (-4.59) (-4.48) (-4.76) (-4.69) (3.75) (4.52) (3.98) (4.23) (4.53) (4.61)
Log(asset) -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.019 -0.019 -0.015 -0.010 -0.005 -0.015 -0.022 -0.014 -0.017
(-0.63) (-0.51) (-0.47) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-0.49) (-0.36) (-0.19) (-0.49) (-0.77) (-0.51) (-0.57)
ROA 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.90) (0.82) (0.89) (1.25) (0.99) (1.01) (0.76) (0.82) (1.06) (0.97) (0.80) (0.88)
Inv_Growth 0.402 0.427 0.455 0.290 0.273 0.448 0.492* 0.532* 0.431 0.340 0.440 0.427
(1.81) (1.77) (1.89) (1.36) (1.21) (1.87) (1.98) (2.04) (1.78) (1.42) (1.77) (1.73)
Leverage -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(-0.30) (-0.31) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.48) (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.03) (0.08) (-0.11) (-0.24) (0.01)
Dividend dummy -0.156 -0.158 -0.148 -0.157 -0.181 -0.140 -0.155 -0.153 -0.146 -0.136 -0.153 -0.129
(-1.29) (-1.30) (-1.20) (-1.33) (-1.51) (-1.14) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-1.25) (-1.05)
Production cost -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.78) (-0.67) (-0.76) (-0.60) (-0.70) (-0.92) (-0.74) (-0.67) (-0.64)
Oil Gas
Panel B: dependent variable is ln(Q2), Q2=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets - BV Oil/Gas Reserves+MV of Reserves)
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Table IV – Continued 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Delta_Production(Total) -0.270 0.346
(-0.58) (1.09)
Delta_Production(Total)*HV180 0.686 -0.387
(0.42) (-0.80)
Delta_Production(Linear) -0.259 0.406
(-0.76) (1.31)
Delta_Production(Linear)*HV180 0.851 -0.467
(0.72) (-1.11)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.351 -0.190
(1.71) (-0.43)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear)*HV180 -1.207 0.250
(-1.51) (0.41)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 2.343 -0.629
(0.65) (-0.37)
Delta_Reserve(Total)*HV180 -8.670 -2.562
(-0.71) (-0.92)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) -2.365 0.638
(-0.63) (0.35)
Delta_Reserve(Linear)*HV180 7.478 -2.941
(0.67) (-0.93)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 5.910* -3.913
(2.04) (-1.29)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear)*HV180 -21.771* 3.506
(-2.03) (1.02)
HV180 1.002 1.053 1.363 1.36 1.077 1.467 -0.338 -0.373 -0.467 -0.41 -0.389 -0.463
(0.90) (1.01) (1.28) (1.24) (1.04) (1.39) (-0.71) (-0.87) (-1.10) (-1.14) (-0.92) (-1.18)
Log(asset) -0.060* -0.061** -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** -0.064** -0.064** -0.062** -0.052* -0.057* -0.060*
(-2.54) (-2.61) (-2.66) (-2.65) (2.61) (-2.66) (-3.09) (-3.06) (-2.66) (2.20) (-2.51) (-2.57)
ROA 0.025** 0.025* 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 0.025 0.025**
(2.63) (2.57) (2.59) (2.63) (2.58) (2.59) (2.61) (2.58) (2.66) (2.59) (2.56) (2.60)
Inv_Growth 0.602 0.578 0.582 0.586 0.589 0.577 0.550 0.564 0.585 0.705 0.628 0.610
(1.61) (1.53) (1.60) (1.58) (1.57) (1.60) (1.63) (1.71) (1.61) (1.88) (1.71) (1.71)
Leverage 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.015* 0.013* 0.015* 0.013*
(2.41) (2.33) (2.42) (2.44) (2.28) (2.38) (2.39) (2.27) (2.20) (2.20) (2.55) (2.05)
Dividend dummy 0.093 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.093 0.090 0.095 0.096 0.092 0.072 0.089 0.075
(0.91) (0.92) (0.89) (0.90) (0.94) (0.87) (0.95) (0.97) (0.89) (0.69) (0.87) (0.72)
Production cost -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.50) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.56) (-0.52)
Oil Gas
Panel C: dependent variable is ln(Q3), Q3=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets)
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Table IV – Continued 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Delta_Production(Total) 0.054 -0.004
(0.30) (-0.02)
Delta_Production(Total)*HV_Dummy 0.083 0.097
(0.36) (0.34)
Delta_Production(Linear) -0.023 -0.061
(-0.13) (-0.41)
Delta_Production(Linear)*HV_Dummy 0.099 -0.036
(0.47) (-0.16)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.114** 0.143
(3.22) (0.43)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear)*HV_Dummy -0.015 0.278
(-0.28) (0.67)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 1.863* -0.339
(2.55) (-0.28)
Delta_Reserve(Total)*HV_Dummy -1.036 -0.664
(-1.02) (-0.35)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) 1.347 -0.475
(0.62) (-0.43)
Delta_Reserve(Linear)*HV_Dummy -0.969 -1.266
(-0.46) (-0.68)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 1.845** 0.154
(2.95) (0.06)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear)*HV_Dummy -0.823 -0.654
(-0.94) (-0.25)
HV_Dummy -0.352** -0.345** -0.330** -0.312** -0.328** -0.320** 0.299* 0.317* 0.279* 0.330* 0.323** 0.327**
(-3.30) (-3.90) (-3.87) (-3.33) (-3.85) (-3.72) (2.04) (2.52) (2.35) (2.39) (2.58) (3.06)
Log(asset) -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001
(-0.19) (-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.16) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.15) (0.12) (-0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.03)
ROA 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017* 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(2.70) (2.60) (2.71) (2.81) (2.63) (2.74) (2.69) (2.56) (2.93) (2.68) (2.59) (2.61)
Inv_Growth 0.359 0.380 0.391 0.332 0.365 0.394 0.380 0.428 0.381 0.442 0.455 0.409
(1.09) (1.12) (1.19) (1.05) (1.12) (1.21) (1.20) (1.31) (1.17) (1.28) (1.33) (1.23)
Leverage 0.002 0.0025 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.0025 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.28) (0.30) (0.44) (0.39) (0.23) (0.48) (0.31) (0.38) (0.57) (0.25) (0.40) (0.24)
Dividend dummy -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 -0.016 -0.002 -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 -0.017 -0.012 -0.016
(-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.14) (-0.19) (-0.02) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.02) (-0.19) (-0.15) (-0.19)
Production cost 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.81) (0.82) (0.77) (0.76) (0.78) (0.75) (0.75) (0.77) (0.46) (0.81) (0.75) (0.78)
Oil Gas
Panel D: dependent variable is ln(Q1), Q1=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets - BV Oil/Gas Reserves+NPV of Reserves)
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Table IV – Continued 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Delta_Production(Total) 0.222 -0.056
(1.56) (-0.30)
Delta_Production(Total)*HV_Dummy -0.090 -0.035
(-0.39) (-0.15)
Delta_Production(Linear) 0.136 -0.222
(0.85) (-1.25)
Delta_Production(Linear)*HV_Dummy -0.079 -0.047
(-0.39) (-0.23)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.121** 0.376
(3.88) (1.35)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear)*HV_Dummy -0.070 -0.068
(-1.12) (-0.19)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 3.201** 1.784
(3.02) (1.75)
Delta_Reserve(Total)*HV_Dummy -0.127 0.569
(-0.12) (0.29)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) 4.502** 0.808
(2.70) (0.75)
Delta_Reserve(Linear)*HV_Dummy -1.053 -0.722
(-0.55) (-0.36)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 2.516** 2.510
(3.08) (1.35)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear)*HV_Dummy -0.502 -0.946
(-0.49) (-0.50)
HV_Dummy -0.301** -0.312** -0.305** -0.324** -0.322** -0.310** 0.341** 0.320** 0.327** 0.343** 0.353** 0.344**
(-3.30) (-4.26) (-4.42) (-4.13) (-4.55) (-4.43) (2.85) (3.21) (3.24) (2.95) (3.53) (3.88)
Log(asset) -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.019 -0.018 0.000 -0.010 -0.005 -0.015 -0.022 -0.015 -0.017
(-0.62) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.65) (-0.61) (0.04) (-0.36) (-0.19) (-0.49) (-0.77) (-0.51) (-0.57)
ROA 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.89) (0.81) (0.88) (1.25) (0.98) (1.00) (0.77) (0.81) (1.02) (0.98) (0.80) (0.87)
Inv_Growth 0.402 0.426 0.456 0.290 0.273 0.448 0.493* 0.533* 0.428 0.340 0.440 0.425
(1.81) (1.77) (1.88) (1.36) (1.21) (1.88) (1.98) (2.04) (1.74) (1.42) (1.77) (1.72)
Leverage -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.50) (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.03) (0.06) (-0.11) (-0.25) (0.02)
Dividend dummy -0.155 -0.157 -0.148 -0.157 -0.181 -0.140 -0.154 -0.154 -0.147 -0.136 -0.152 -0.130
(-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.20) (-1.33) (-1.51) (-1.14) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.19) (-1.11) (-1.25) (-1.05)
Production cost -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.68) (-0.78) (-0.65) (-0.76) (-0.60) (-0.70) (-0.89) (-0.74) (-0.67) (-0.63)
Oil Gas
Panel E: dependent variable is ln(Q2), Q2=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets - BV Oil/Gas Reserves+MV of Reserves)
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Table IV – Continued 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Delta_Production(Total) -0.193 0.167
(-1.14) (1.05)
Delta_Production(Total)*HV_Dummy 0.212 -0.124
(0.99) (-0.53)
Delta_Production(Linear) -0.123 0.219
(-0.91) (1.18)
Delta_Production(Linear)*HV_Dummy 0.199 -0.193
(1.20) (-0.90)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear) 0.060 -0.152
(1.56) (-0.53)
Delta_Production(Nonlinear)*HV_Dummy -0.090 0.198
(-1.54) (0.65)
Delta_Reserve(Total) 0.324 -1.521
(0.32) (-1.47)
Delta_Reserve(Total)*HV_Dummy -0.840 -1.285
(-0.74) (-.90)
Delta_Reserve(Linear) -0.910 -0.396
(-0.50) (-0.39)
Delta_Reserve(Linear)*HV_Dummy 1.132 -1.426
(0.85) (-0.89)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear) 0.683 -2.862
(0.85) (-1.51)
Delta_Reserve(Nonlinear)*HV_Dummy -1.781* 1.980
(-2.15) (1.10)
HV_Dummy 0.054 0.077 0.113 0.119 0.087 0.124 0.037 0.041 -0.013 0.017 0.011 -0.015
(0.49) (0.81) (1.23) (1.18) (0.95) (1.34) (0.26) (0.33) (-0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (-0.14)
Log(asset) -0.60* -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** -0.62** -0.065** -0.064** -0.062** -0.052* -0.057* -0.060*
(-2.55) (-2.63) (-2.67) (-2.65) (-2.62) (-2.66) (-3.07) (-3.03) (-2.66) (-2.20) (-2.51) (-2.57)
ROA 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 0.025* 0.025**
(2.64) (2.58) (2.59) (2.62) (2.58) (2.58) (2.61) (2.58) (2.64) (2.58) (2.56) (2.59)
Inv_Growth 0.596 0.568 0.580 0.587 0.591 0.578 0.550 0.565 0.588 0.705 0.630 0.613
(1.60) (1.49) (1.60) (1.58) (1.58) (1.60) (1.63) (1.72) (1.62) (1.88) (1.72) (1.71)
Leverage 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.014* 0.013* 0.015* 0.013*
(2.44) (2.39) (2.42) (2.42) (2.28) (2.37) (2.39) (2.23) (2.18) (2.21) (2.52) (2.02)
Dividend dummy 0.094 0.094 0.093 0.092 0.093 0.090 0.095 0.096 0.093 0.073 0.090 0.075
(0.92) (0.93) (0.90) (0.91) (0.94) (0.87) (0.94) (0.96) (0.90) (0.70) (0.88) (0.72)
Production cost -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.56) (-0.53)
Oil Gas
Panel F: dependent variable is ln(Q3), Q3=(MV Assets)/(BV Total Assets)
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